The social brain hypothesis suggests that humans evolved larger brains and intelligence as adaptations to an increasingly complex social environment. We believe that social role division is a key factor in the evolution of social intelligence. To examine the the role of this factor, we extend Challet and Zhang's Minority Game by adding a pre-decision communication stage and using a continuous strategy space instead of a binary one, and develop an evolutionary model based on this game. The evolutionary simulations demonstrate that the system alternates between two states: one with homogeneous social behavior and the other with heterogeneous behavior. We observe differentiation of social roles in the latter state: we find a "pivotal agent" that tends to adopt low-risk, low payoff strategies but determines which strategy will be in the minority and which in the majority, and we find "risk taker" that tend to adopt high-risk, high pay-off strategies. Using social sensitivity as a measure of social intelligence, we show that the level of social sensitivity correlates with the social roles, and is also a major factor in the mechanisms by which social roles switch.
Introduction
Primates, including humans, have relatively large brains and more highly developed intelligence than other mammals. However, the question why and how they acquired this high intelligence remains unsolved. In recent years, the "social brain hypothesis" has attracted the attention of researchers trying to explain the evolution of human intelligence. The hypothesis claims that primates' large brains reflect the computational demands of their complex social environment (Dunbar, 1998) , and that social conflicts played an important role in the evolution of primate intelligence (Chance and Mead, 1953) .
When we consider the social interactions in especially humans, we see that "role" is key ingredient. The richness and importance of roles in human society is outstanding compared to the other primates (Wilson, 1975) . Moreover, humans can switch roles dynamically in response to varying social situations. Our highly developed social intelligence is speculated to be necessary for us to act appropriately in response to observations of others in a large variety of social situations.
The purpose of this study is to clarify the relationship between role differentiation/switching and social intelligence from a coevolutionary perspective. Specifically, we perform evolutionary simulations using the Dynamic Minority Game (DMG) to investigate the mechanisms of the emergence and dynamic switching of social roles, and the relationship between social intelligence and role division.
The Minority Game (MG), initially proposed by Challet and Zhang (Challet and Zhang, 1997) , is a minimalist econophysics platform that captures a common social scenario. In each round, N (odd) agents independently choose between two options, and those who have selected the least selected option (i.e. the minority side) win and are awarded a point.
DMG is an extension of MG in two aspects. 1) Agents select a strategy from a continuous space instead of two alternatives, and 2) a pre-decision communication stage is incorporated. These modifications make it possible for DMG to express 1) a kind of social role division, and 2) a dynamic decision making process involving negotiation between agents, respectively.
Our evolutionary simulations show that the system alternates between three phases. We see a differentiation of social roles in one of the phases: we find a "pivotal agent" that tends to adopt a low-risk, low payoff strategies but determines which strategy will be in the minority and which in the majority, and we find "risk takers" that tend to adopt a highrisk, high pay-off strategies. This paper focuses on the role of social sensitivity (a measure of social intelligence) dynamics in the transitions between phases and in role switching mechanisms.
Dynamic Minority Game (DMG)
In the Minority Game with N agents proposed by Challet and Zhang, the payof f of an agent i choosing alternative A i is calculated as follows:
We propose a Dynamic Minority Game by extending the Minority Game on the following two points. First, we adopt a continuous strategy space instead of a binary one. The payoff of agent i with strategy value a i is calculated as follows:
This equation represents the situation as follows: The possible signs of the strategy value (positive or negative) correspond to the alternatives in the standard Minority Game. Agents win the game if the sign of their strategy is the minority sign in the group. Furthermore, the strategy's absolute value defines its "intensity". Higher intensity values lead to both higher risk and higher reward. The winning agents obtain a positive payoff equal to the absolute value of their strategies.
Secondly, we add a pre-decision communication stage before the agents confirm their strategy. During this stage, agents can continuously adjust their strategy. The tentative strategy of agent i at time step t (= 0, 1, .., T − 1) is represented as a i (t)(a i (0) = 0). Each agent can adjust a i (t) gradually by ϵ(t), after observing others' tentative strategies in the previous step. The final decision of agent i : a i is defined as a i (T ), and used for calculation of payoffs (3).
In this study, we focus on the case of N = 3, the minimum number of agents for a Minority Game. Figure 1 shows an example game. The x-coordinate corresponds to the time step t and the y-coordinate represents a i (t) for each agent.
Model

Mechanism of decision making
Every agent is equipped with a Recurrent Neural Network (RNN) to decide ϵ(t) at each step. The reason why we choose to use Recurrent NNs is to enable agents to make decisions appropriately depending not only on the current inputs, but also on past inputs: RNNs can use their internal memory to process arbitrary sequences of inputs. Each RNN has three layers (5 input units, 6 hidden units, 4 output units), and the units use a sigmoid activation function (f (x) = 1/1 + exp(−x)). For simplification of the model, RNNs do not have bias units. Two output units in the output layer are recurrently connected to two input units in the input layer. Every time step, the agent's RNN receives five input values: its own current strategy value, the distance from the strategy values of the other two agents to its own, and the values from the two output units from the previous step. Two units in the output layer generate the values au and ad, which determine ϵ(t + 1) = ϵ(t) + (au − ad)/100. The remaining two output units are connected one-to-one to two of input units.
Evolutionary Algorithm
The full set of 54 connection weights in each RNN is encoded in the genotype of each agent and evolved using a simple type of Evolutionary Strategy (ES). The connection weights do not change during a trial. We assume three independent gene pools, each of which provides one agent in each trial, so the agents that interact in a game trial come from independently evolved gene pools. Each gene pool has N p individuals. At the beginning of each generation, we randomly assemble N p groups of three individuals, one from each pool. Then, one trial of Dynamic Minority Game is played in each group. This procedure of group assembly and game trial is repeated R times. The fitness of each individual is defined as accumulated payoff over R trials. The population in the next generation of each gene pool is composed as follows: First, we select n best individuals from N p individuals (the elite), and preserve them to the next generation. Then, each of elite contributes two copies of themselves to the next generation, and small random values from a normal distribution with a fixed standard deviation are added to each connection weight in the offspring. Finally, N p − 3n individuals with randomly generated genotypes are added to the population. These evolutionary operations for selection and reproduction are performed on each gene pool independently.
Evaluation of social sensitivity
In order to be able to track evolution of social intelligence in this model, we define a measure of "social sensitivity" of an agent, which estimates the degree to which the focal agent responds sensibly to the others' strategy values. In a DMG with three agents, the optimal strategy value of an agent that maximizes its expected payoff can be derived from the strategy values of the other two agents under the assumption that all agents adopt their current tentative strategy at the last time step. This optimal strategy will be -1, 0, or +1. When the strategies of the other two agents are positive (negative), the optimal strategy of the focal agent is -1 (+1). When the signs of the other agents are different, the optimal strategy is 0. If an agent tends to keep its strategy close to the optimal value, we interpret this as an indication that the agent makes a decision based on the observation of others, in other words, the individual has high social sensitivity.
Specifically, we divided the strategy space at each step into three areas: area 1 = [-1, -0.33], area 2 = [-0.33, +0.33] and area 3 = [+0.33, 1], corresponding to the optimal strategy values of -1, 0, and 1 respectively. We prepared some pairs of test agents with fixed predefined behavioral patterns, to serve as static social environments for measuring the social sensitivity of an agent. The social sensitivity is defined as the average proportion of steps during which the agent's strategy value is in the optimal area. A preliminary analysis showed that agents that ignore others' behavior score a social sensitivity value of about 0.3, agents that consider one of the other agents' behavior score about 0.5, and agents that observe and respond appropriately to the behavior of both of the other two agents reach a sensitivity score between 0.8 and 0.9.
Results
Evolution of agent's behavior
We evolved the population for 10000 generations. We used the following parameter settings: T = 1000, N p = 40, n = 12, R = 40. Initial connection weights are drawn randomly from a uniform distribution over [-1, 1] , and mutation adds a random number from the normal distribution N (0, 0.2 2 ). Although we confirmed that the results did not vary qualitatively even if using different parameters, it was observed that the whole system becomes more stable when we set the standard deviation of the normal distribution N lower. The details will be described later.
First, we focus on how behavior and social sensitivity develop during the early stages of the evolution process. Figure 2 represents the average fitness of each gene pool and the average fitness of all individuals from the 0th generation to the 99th generation. We see a rapid increase of fitness in all gene pools. The average fitness reached to approximately -5 at the 99th generation. Figure 3 shows the evolution of social sensitivity for the same experiment depicted in Figure 2 . We see that social sensitivity increased gradually, but there are significant differences between gene pools. We will return to this point later. shows an example behavior at the 10th generation, when the social sensitivity was still low. We see that the strategy value of one agent reached the upper limit and that of another agent reached the lower limit, while the remaining agent's value remained near the boundary line (a i (T ) = 0). We focus on the agent whose strategy value remained near the boundary line. In the situation shown in Figure 4 , the strategies of the other two agents are on the upper and the lower area respectively, and they did not change their strategy values. Thus, the focal agent could not avoid ending up on the majority side, and so its payoff falls below 0 regardless of which side it picks. The optimal behavior thus is to choose a strategy value as close to the boundary line as it can, and receive payoff of near 0. It was often observed in the simulations that the final strategies of the three agents settled on these three positions on the strategy space: the upper limit, around the boundary line, and the lower limit. Such differentiation of behavior as observed in Figure  4 is expected to appear often because diversity of strategies is essential to good performance in minority games.
The average payoff of each agent over R trials becomes near 0, if 1) the final strategy of the agent nearby the boundary line stays very close to it, and 2) its sign splits fifty-fifty between positive and negative. In this scenario, the situa- tion where the final strategies fall in the same area of the strategy space (yielding payoff far below 0) is avoided. This scenario is speculated to be a kind of equilibrium for each agent. Each of these three areas on the strategy space can be said to correspond to a "role" in avoiding situations that are disadvantageous to all. Thus, the observed distribution of strategy choice can be interpreted as a form of "role differentiation" between agents. In Figure 2 we see an increase in average fitness from the initial generation to the 20th generation, likely due to the emergence of this role differentiation. We refer to the two agents who choose strategies at the upper and lower limit as "risk taker" because they aim for high profit at high risk. We refer to the agent who stays near the boundary as a "pivotal agent" because the winner is decided by the sign of its strategy value. In addition, "pivotal agent" is considered to play a crucial role in maintaining the role division structure. If pivotal agent's strategy is biased to one side, the fitness of risk taker on that side decreases. As a result, the risk taker cannot but change its risk-taking strategy, breaking the stable role division.
By the 70th generation, gene pool 1 (for Agent 1) and of gene pool 3 (for Agent 3) had both evolved high social sensitivity as shown in Figure 3 (b) . Figure 5 shows a representative game from the 70th generation in which Agent 1 and Agent 3 can be seen to respond each other's behavior. In Figure 5 , all agents initially lower their strategy values. Agent 3 (at around step 40), and Agent 1 (at around step 80) can be seen to switch direction and start increasing their strategy values, in order to avoid the situation where the strategy values of all agents remain negative and all lose. Once the strategy value of Agent 1 surpasses 0 (at around step 150), Agent 3 switches direction again in response. The most likely explanation for these behaviors of Agent 1 and Agent 3 is that they changed the increase or decrease in their strategy values in response to the strategy values of others. Figure 6 shows the behavior of agents at the 80th generation. We can observe that agents interacted with each other more actively than was the case in the earlier generations. In Figure 3 (c) , we see that all gene pools acquired relatively high social sensitivity at the 80th generation, which is likely the cause of the increased fluctuation of agents' strategy values. This sort of fluctuation was often observed in the simulation. Figure 8 shows example behavior of an individual agent that appeared during the evolutionary simulation. This agent has a social sensitivity score of 0.9. We show its behavior in one of our static test environments. We observe that the agent adjusts its own strategy appropriately in response to the positions and movements of the other agents' strategy values.
Evolution of social sensitivity
Figure 7 (A) shows the average social sensitivity of individuals in each gene pool from the 1100th generation to the 6330th generation in the evolutionary simulation. It is noteworthy that not necessarily all of individuals reached high social sensitivity, and that social sensitivity varied per gene pool. We divide the transition of the social sensitivity shown in Figure 7 (A) into three phases as follows:
Phase 1: One gene pool evolves high social sensitivity, while the sensitivity of the other two pools remains lower (Figure 7 (1), (3), (6), (8), (10)).
Phase 2: Two pools evolve high social sensitivity, while the sensitivity of the remaining one remains low (Figure 7 (2), (4), (7), (9)). These phases spontaneously switched through the generations. When we set the standard deviation of normal distribution N low, the period of Phase 1 tends to increase, and that of Phase 2 and 3 tends to decrease. Also, it was observed that the frequency of phase switch became low. The differences in social sensitivity level between gene pools are closely related to the social roles (i.e. strategies) the pools adopt. We will return to this point below. 
Role differentiation between gene pools
In this section, we examine whether there is behavioral differentiation between gene pools. We divide the final strategy space into three areas, and label them Area 1 ∼ 3 from the bottom to top (see Figure 1) . Area 1 and Area 3 correspond to the risk taker's strategies, and Area 2 corresponds to the pivotal agent's strategy. Figure 7 
(B), (C) and (D)
show each pool's strategy choice distribution over these areas, from the 1100th to the 6330th generation. These reveal the characteristics of the individual gene pools, showing that significant between-pool differentiation occurs in behavioral tendencies. For instance, Figure 7 (6) shows that from the 3840th generation to the 4850th generation, the individuals in gene pool 1 picked strategies in Area 2 with high probability and rarely strategies in Area 1 or Area 3. On the other hand, in gene pool 1 and gene pool 3 we see a strong tendency to pick strategies in Area 1 and Area 3 over strategies in Area 2. In other words, role differentiation (risk taker / pivotal agent) occurred between gene pools. As with social sensitivity, we can distinguish two phases with respect to role differentiation: one with clear role differentiation between pivotal agent and risk takers, and one without clear differentiation. We elaborate on this observation in the next section.
Relationship between roles and social sensitivity
Here we focus on the observation that the role differentiation phases and the social sensitivity phases often shift at the same time. Looking at Figure 7 we can see that the state of the gene pools alternated between Phase 1 (clear role differentiation and social sensitivity differentiation) and Phases 2, 3 (unclear role differentiation). Figure 9 shows the relationship between social sensitivity and strategy area. We see that the social sensitivity of individuals that tend to choose strategies in Area 2 is higher than that of the other individuals.
To clarify this relation, we focus on Phase 1. In this Phase, we see a clear differentiation both in roles and social sensitivity across gene pools, with high and low social sensitivity correlating strongly with the tendency to reach Area 2 or Ar-eas 1 or 3, respectively. In other words, there is a clear role division: a pivotal agent with high social sensitivity and two risk takers with low social sensitivity. The reason for this would be as follows. Depending on the sign of the final strategy of the pivotal agent, the risk takers can attain an average payoff per game above 0. However, the average payoff of the pivotal agent is always slightly below 0, because the pivotal agent always ends up on the majority side. Therefore in order to maximize its payoff, the pivotal agent must pay closer attention to others' actions, which evolves social sensitivity of pivotal agent.
The analyses in this section make it clear that there is a high correlation between the social sensitivity and the social roles of the gene pools.
Role switch between gene pools
So far, we have divided the roles into pivotal agent and risk takers. However, role differentiation also occurs between gene pools which play the role of risk takers. We now focus on role switching between risk takers (Figure 10 (A) ). Figure 11 shows the social sensitivity of each gene pool, and the distribution of strategy choice over the three areas for gene pool 1 and gene pool 3 from the 8818th generation to the 8838th generation. We see that at the 8818th generation, individuals from gene pool 1 mostly pick strategies in Area 1, and that individuals from gene pool 3 mostly pick strategies in Area 3. That is, individuals from both pools play the risk-taking role. The fact that the pools consistently pick complementary risk taking roles can be regarded as role differentiation between these two pools. Figure 11 shows two switches in this role division, one over the course of generations 8820 ∼ 8822 and one over the course of generations 8830 ∼ 8834. Role switching between risk taker gene pools occurred often in Phase 1. It is noteworthy that Phase 1 remains stable over such a role switch.
The mechanism of role switching between risk takers gene pools can be summarized as follows:
1. In the gene pool with the lower social sensitivity (gene pool 3 in Figure 11 ), mutation causes the appearance of a mutant offspring with a different behavioral tendency from the rest of its pool. This new behavioral tendency spreads in the gene pool if by chance the mutant individual gets good payoffs.
2. The average social sensitivity of the other gene pool (gene pool 1 in Figure 11 ) is 0.5. This means that individuals in this pool are to some extent sensitive to others' behavior. Therefore, when a mutation causes a sudden change of behavioral tendency in the other pool, this pool can switch its behavior in response. In short, this type of role switching results from mutationcaused change of the behavioral tendency of a gene pool with low social sensitivity, and the subsequent social sensitivity-based adaptation to that change by the gene pool with higher social sensitivity. In other words, social intelligence enables individuals to switch their roles flexibly and dynamically when others' behavior suddenly changes. If, on the other hand, behavioral tendency changes in the gene pool with higher social sensitivity, the individuals in the other gene pool, having low social sensitivity, cannot adapt. Consequently in this situation, role switching is expected not to occur.
In Phase 1, social sensitivity of the three gene pools often settles around 0.8 ∼ 0.9, 0.5, and 0.3. This distribution of social sensitivity is thought to be a robust configuration that stabilizes the whole system, even if the behavioral tendency of the gene pool with the lowest social sensitivity suddenly changes due to mutation.
We conclude from this analysis that social intelligence plays an important role for role switching between gene pools. Next, we focus on the role switching between three gene pools (Figure 10 (B) ). Figure 12 (A) shows the social sensitivity of each gene pool from the 3767th generation to the 3880th generation. Figure 12 (B) ∼ (D) shows the distribution of strategy choice over the areas for each gene pool. We see that social sensitivity shifts phase from Phase 3 to Phase 2, and from Phase 2 to Phase 1. We also see a transition period from an ambiguous state to a stable state with clear role differentiation.
The transition process can be explained as follows:
1. Figure 12 shows that around the 3778th generation (i), gene pool 2 saw a rapid decrease in social sensitivity (A), and simultaneously a rapid increase in the proportion of individuals picking strategies in Area 3 (C), indicating a shift towards picking strategies in Area 3 without observing the behavior of the other agents. This constitutes a phase shift in the global social sensitivity configuration from Phase 3 to Phase 2. It was observed several times in our simulations that the sort of role switch as occurs at time (i) is caused by a decrease in social sensitivity.
2. In response to this change in gene pool 2, the individuals in gene pool 1, who tended to pick strategies in Area 3 until the 3778th generation, switch their choice of strategy areas to Area 1.
3. Then in response to this change in pool 1, individuals in gene pool 3 switch their strategy choice from Area 1 to Area 2. This restores global stability, which is then maintained for a while.
We can regard this process as a chain reaction of role switches across the three gene pools triggered by a behavioral mutation in one gene pool (pool 2 in this case). Next we look at the transition process starting around generation 3806 (Figure 12 (ii)).
4. A decrease in social sensitivity occurs in gene pool 3 over the 3806th to the 3809th generation, and the individuals in gene pool 3 come to pick strategies in Area 1. The decrease in sensitivity constitutes a shift in global social sensitivity configuration from Phase 2 to Phase 1. In response to the behavior change in gene pool 3, the individuals in gene pool 1 switch their strategy choice from Area 1 to Area 2. This completes a role switch between gene pool 1 and gene pool 3.
5. Subsequently, a role switch occurs between pool 2 and pool 3 (a role switch between risk taker pools) occurring gradually over a relatively long time span.
Finally, the population reaches a stable state where the strategy choice in gene pool 1 is in Area 2 (pivotal agent role), the strategy choice in gene pool 2 is in Area 1, and the strategy choice in gene pool 3 in Area 3 (risk taker role). Social sensitivity of the gene pools at the 3880th generation was 0.82, 0.32, and 0.46, an instance of the robust configuration mentioned above. Figure 12 (A) shows that past the 3806th generation the individuals in gene pool 1 came to have a tendency to primarily pick strategies from Area 2. At the same time, the social sensitivity of gene pool 1 starts to increase gradually after the 3806th generation. This means that social sensitivity in gene pool 1 evolved to high values as its individuals played the pivotal agent role. 
Conclusions
In this paper we introduced the Dynamic Minority Game as an extension of the standard Minority Game, and used it to investigate the mechanisms of the emergence and dynamic switching of social roles, as well as the relationship between social intelligence and social role, in a computational model. We defined a social sensitivity measure as a means to track the social intelligence and evaluated the dynamics of the model. We found that the system switches between three phases, characterized by the difference in global social sensitivity configuration over three gene pools each of which provides one agent for the three-player Dynamic Minority Game. When the difference in the social sensitivity between the gene pools is large, role division tends to be stable. In one of the phases two distinct roles emerge: we see a "pivotal agent" with high social sensitivity adopting primarily low-risk, low payoff strategies but with its choice determining the payoff outcomes of the other agents, and two "risk takers" with low social sensitivity adopting primarily highrisk, high payoff strategies. We then focused on the mechanism of the transitions between system phases, and on transitions between social roles. It was shown that social sensitivity plays a critical role in both transitions. We observed that sudden mutationinduced behavior changes in one pool can be compensated by other, socially sensitive pools via a role switch.
We note three points of particular interest in our results. First, we observed that agent behavior evolves in tandem with social sensitivity and that our evolutionary model captures such aspects of social behavior as differentiation of social role and dynamic fluctuations therein. Agents observe each others' strategy values, and change their own strategies accordingly, so we can regard the agent's behavior in pre-decision communication stage as a type of signal. The evolution of animal signals has been studied by many researchers (Smith and Harper, 2004) . Our observation that signals change with the evolution of social intelligence is expected to provide new perspectives to these researches.
Secondly, we saw that roles are differentiated most clearly when there is large variation in social sensitivity between pools. This result suggests that fixation of social role division over the pools causes large differences in social intelligence between pools. Moreover, it indicates that the difference in social sensitivity helps to fixate social roles and stabilize society. Andrew et. al suggest that character differences are crucial for the emergence of leadership and followership, and that, they are maintained in populations because they foster social coordination (King et al., 2009 ). If we view our social sensitivity measure as a character trait, then our results support strongly this hypothesis. From the view of leadership, the pivotal agent can be described as a leader in three agents as we suggested the probability that pivotal agent plays an important role to stabilize the role division structure. Research on leadership has shown individuals who are bold and do not care about others are likely to become leaders (Conradt et al., 2009) (Vugt, 2006) . However, in our experiments, the individual with highest social sensitivity becomes a leader, which provides a different perspective.
Thirdly, we saw that role switching can be initiated via a decrease in social sensitivity, or a change of behavioral tendency in a pool with low social sensitivity, and then completed by the adaptive behavior of individuals with higher social sensitivity. Drea and Carter conducted experiments to investigate cooperative behavior in pairs of spotted hyenas (Drea and Carter, 2009) . When a naive animal unfamiliar with the task was paired with a dominant experienced animal, it was observed that the dominant one switched its social role, and adjusted its behavior to the naive one to accomplish the task. This result is similar to our results in that the roles are switched by the adjustment of the more capable agents to the less capable ones. It is noteworthy that the role switching dynamics we observed in a competitive setup so resemble the role switching that Drea and Carter observed in cooperative behavior.
